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4 December 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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*USSR--Nuclear Tests: From an extensive conversation with Khrushchev on 2 December, Senator Humphrey gained the impression that the USSR is seeking agreement on test suspension and is prepared to make some concessions, but that the Soviets do not expect to reach agreement on surprise attack. Khrushchev professed great concern over American proposals to permit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. While indicating a preference for a ban with no exceptions, Khrushchev said there should at least be a limit on such explosions with provision for an equal number for each side. Khrushchev agreed that provisions for cessation of tests and controls should be embodied in one document and said that he has so instructed his delegation on 28 November.

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Watch Committee conclusion - Berlin: There is no assurance that the USSR will wait for the full six months' period mentioned in the Soviet note on 27 November before transferring to the East Germans control over Allied traffic to Berlin or undertaking harassment of some other sort. The Soviet note, however, suggests that the USSR intends to keep the Berlin problem in the political arena for at least the immediate future.

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Watch Committee conclusion - Taiwan Strait: The Chinese Communists retain the capability to initiate major military action in the offshore islands area without prior warning. However, the Communists do not appear to intend, in the immediate future, to terminate the self-imposed restriction against interference with resupply operations on alternate days.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Watch Committee conclusion - Middle East: A deliberate initiation of open hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future, although the situation remains unstable throughout the area. The Iraqi internal situation continues to be potentially explosive and there are additional reports of plots to overthrow the Qasim regime in the near future. Qasim is in danger of becoming even more dependent on Communist support in the intensifying power struggle.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Tunisia: President Bourguiba's recent announcement about buying up all foreign-owned farm lands may have been motivated primarily by a desire to build up his domestic prestige. He is currently on a tour of poverty-stricken southern Tunisia, and he may have become convinced that his popularity has declined. The announcement will add to the fears of European landowners in Algeria who feel that anything less than full integration of Algeria with metropolitan France would place their property in jeopardy.

Morocco: The differences between moderates and left-wing extremists within the dominant Istiqlal party have deepened and may ultimately lead to a breakup of the party. Party leader Allal el-Fassi seems to have failed to form a compromise cabinet which would replace the Balafrej government, whose resignation was announced on 3 December. The King may have to assume a more direct role. He has thus far hesitated to jeopardize his position through involvement in the governmental crisis.

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Greece-Cyprus: The Greeks anticipate they will be rebuffed by the UN on the Cyprus issue and the government will try to divert public attention from this failure by a propaganda campaign, marked by attacks on the United States. Normally pro-American newspapers in Athens are already denouncing the American attitude in the United Nations.

All-African Peoples' Conference: African nationalism will receive another strong psychological boost when representatives from nationalist parties and movements in independent and dependent African territories meet in Accra from 5 to 12 December. The principal avowed purpose of this non-governmental gathering--which appears likely to be heavily influenced by nationalist extremists and possibly pro-Communists--is to prepare a "blueprint" for a "nonviolent revolution" against colonialism and racial discrimination.
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Indonesia: A 5 December meeting of President Sukarno and key cabinet members may prove a turning point in the contest for governmental control between the army and political parties.

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III. THE WEST

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UN-Guinea: Guinea applied for UN membership on 2 December. The Security Council will take action on Guinea's application possibly as early as 8 December, with General Assembly action likely on the same day. France hopes to postpone Guinea's entry until next September, but the Canadian UN delegation believes that any delay would greatly harm the West's future relations with Africa.

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LATE ITEM

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*Colombia: President Lleras has declared a state of seige throughout Colombia and arrested former dictator Rojas as preventive measures against an expected coup attempt by his supporters. The arrest will be a test of the loyalty of the armed forces, in which Rojas is believed to have some support. The Rojistas, however, may have tried to provoke the action as a means of touching off their opposition movement which they recently claimed was in too advanced a stage to halt.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Diplomats in Bonn Hint at Soviet Concessions

Soviet diplomats in Bonn are attempting to capitalize on Moscow's Berlin proposals to stimulate interest among West German opposition party leaders in disengagement, expanded contacts with the East Germans, and bloc proposals for an all-German confederation.

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These moves appear to be part of a broader Soviet effort to increase pressure on the West for high-level talks on a general European settlement in which Moscow would try to secure recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy stated privately that Khrushchev was using the notes on Berlin, which would probably be followed by further notes, to reopen East-West negotiations looking toward demilitarization of Germany along the lines of the Rapacki Plan. He said Moscow did not expect the West to accept its terms and expected counterproposals since the West could not agree to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue.

Moscow apparently hopes to use such hints of concessions in return for West German withdrawal from NATO to encourage Bonn opposition parties to challenge the Adenauer government's basic foreign policy positions.

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Ambassador Bruce feels that the Soviet approach will encourage those elements in West Germany which support various schemes for disengagement in central Europe as a means of appeasing Moscow. He believes that considerable public pressure will be generated in favor of reaching some kind of accommodation with Moscow through negotiations.

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Bourguiba's Expropriation Plan Arouses French

Tunisian President Bourguiba's surprise announcement on 29 November that his government plans to purchase all farm lands now held by non-Tunisians during the next "three to four years" has drawn a vigorously hostile reaction from French officials and from some of the 2,600 families of French origin in Tunisia likely to be directly affected. Altogether, about 100,000 persons who have retained French nationality are permanently domiciled in Tunisia.

The counselor of the French Embassy in Tunis said on 1 December that his government had already informed the Tunisians that it would not "tolerate" the elimination of the French farmers. He said their protection, along with that of other "productive" French members of the Tunisian community, was the principal aim of France's "liberal" program toward Tunisia. According to the counselor, many settlers are talking of appealing to the French Army for help if it is not forthcoming from the Paris government.

Bourguiba's current three-week tour of Tunisia's southern provinces, where domestic elements hostile to his leadership have always been strongest, may have convinced him that his prestige has slipped seriously and could only be restored by a dramatic and ultranationalistic gesture. His doubts that De Gaulle can control the French Army and terminate the Algerian conflict may also have helped precipitate the move.

The American Embassy in Tunis believes that even if some loophole is left by which the settlers could continue to use the land, Bourguiba's action is bound to have an unsettling effect. This will be particularly true with respect to potential foreign investors from whom Bourguiba has been seeking much-needed capital. It will also increase the apprehension of French landowners in Algeria that they would be subject to similar action in an independent Algeria, and they can be expected to continue to press for the complete integration of Algeria into metropolitan France.

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Moroccan Government Crisis

The differences between moderate and left-wing factions of the ruling Istiqlal party apparently have been intensified by the futile attempt of Allal el-Fassi, the party's veteran leader, to form a government to replace the Balafrej regime. [redacted]

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Balafrej and the moderates still retain control over the party machinery, but the left wing can be expected to make a strong bid during the Istiqlal congress in January to oust him as secretary general.

King Mohamed V, [redacted]

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[redacted] has hesitated to take a public position during the prolonged governmental crisis, which has devolved largely from the intra-Istiqlal struggle. He now may feel that he has to intervene publicly in governmental affairs, thereby jeopardizing the prestige of the throne, which is already under attack from the pro-republic Istiqlal left wing. [redacted]

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All-African People's Conference

The All-African Peoples' Conference which is to convene in Accra, Ghana's capital, between 5 and 12 December will provide African nationalism with another strong psychological boost. It appears certain to be appreciably more inflammatory and probably more stridently neutralist than was the meeting of eight independent African states held last April, also under the aegis of Ghana's ambitious Prime Minister Nkrumah.

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[redacted] invitations went out to all "progressive" political parties and other organizations in both dependent and independent African territories with the aim of assembling some 500 official delegates. Fraternal delegates, representing sympathizing individuals and groups outside Africa, and observers--including a delegation from the USSR--have also been invited.

The principal avowed purpose of the conference is to prepare a "blueprint" and work out "Ghandi-like tactics and strategy" to guide the African "nonviolent revolution" against colonialism, racialism, and tribalism--terms of reference which point to a conference focused primarily on sub-Saharan Africa. Other topics on the provisional agenda include the special problems of Africans in multiracial territories, the "adjustment of artificial frontiers," and the "amalgamation or federation" of independent African states.

The nongovernmental character of the conference and anticipated preponderance of representatives from areas still struggling to overthrow colonial rule will play into the hands of nationalist and pro-Communist extremists. Nasir's UAR appears to be readying a strong group, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat--despite basic hostility to the Accra meeting as an unwelcome rival to its own Cairo-based "peoples" movement--has announced plans to send a five-member delegation, including nationals of the USSR and Communist China. Many prominent moderate nationalists probably will not attend, partly to avoid identification with what they believe will be minority positions.

[redacted]
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Moscow radio has already begun to exploit the conference as a backdrop for its regular propaganda attacks against Western "imperialism."

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Possible Showdown Between Indonesian Army and Political Parties

A showdown on the Indonesian Army's governmental role, which has been gradually expanding at the expense of political parties, may develop in a 5 December meeting between President Sukarno and key cabinet officers. The meeting has been announced as a discussion of ways to achieve President Sukarno's concept of "guided democracy."

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The meeting may also consider legal measures to limit the activities of political parties.

The army, in addition to its broad powers under martial law since March 1957, now has one cabinet post, is represented in the National Council, and has assigned a ranking officer as consul general in Singapore.

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Strong opposition to the extension of martial law by some leaders of the largest government party, the Indonesian National party, could lead to the party's withdrawal from the Djuanda cabinet. The outcome of the conflict may depend largely on President Sukarno, who has so far apparently approved Nasution's reported plans for steering Indonesia between the extreme Communist left and the extreme Moslem right, but may fear a growing personal challenge from the army chief.

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III. THE WEST

Guinea Applies for UN Membership

Guinea's formal presentation of its application for UN membership to Secretary General Hammarskjold on 2 December makes any further delay in UN action unlikely. Hammarskjold is unenthusiastic, but feels there is no way to avoid calling a Security Council meeting, possibly on 8 December.

France hopes to postpone Guinea's membership by inducing Western members on the Security Council to abstain from voting, thereby withholding council endorsement of Guinea's membership this year for lack of the required seven affirmative votes. Thus far, only China is likely to join France in not voting.

The Canadian UN delegation believes any "footdragging" by the West would be a "catastrophic mistake" which would prejudice future relations with Africa. The Canadians intend to inform the French of the "absurdity" of their maneuver.

Although France has recourse to the veto to prevent Guinea's entry, Paris seems unwilling at this time to take such drastic action.

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